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Abstract. A modern assessment of the classical Boltzmann-Schuetz argument for large-scale 
entropy fluctuations as the origin of our observable cosmological domain is given. The 
emphasis is put on the central implication of this picture which flatly contradicts the weak 
anthropic principle as an epistemological statement about the universe. Therefore, to associate 
this picture with the anthropic principle as it is usually done is unwarranted. In particular, 
Feynman's criticism of the anthropic principle based on the entropy-fluctuation picture is a 
product of this semantic confusion.  
 
Various anthropic principles have been discussed during the last quarter of  
century by cosmologists and philosophers alike (for the bibliography up to 1991, see 
Balashov 1991; for the most comprehensive treatment of issues involved, see Barrow 
and Tipler 1986). In spite of this—by now already rather long—history (especially 
taking into account earlier important contributions like those of Barnes, Whitrow or 
Hoyle), there are still more than a few misunderstandings and confusing issues in the 
field of anthropic reasoning. In order to reduce large ambiguities and confusion still 
reigning in these discussions, here we investigate at some length one of the most 
important problems allegedly amenable to an “anthropic” solution, namely, the 
problem of the thermodynamical arrow of time. As we shall see, this is a nice example 
of actual misuse of the appeal of anthropic principles. 
Let us imagine a static, spatially finite and eternally existing universe. For a 
working model, we can consider classical Einstein (1917) model which marked the 
beginning of the modern cosmology. This model is a static, topologically closed 
universe with a cosmological constant. Let us also, for the time being, forget about 
gravitational collapse, existence of black holes and possible singularities within their 
horizons, and assume that all interactions are classical, and that the equation of state 
of matter is always such as to prevent formation of singularities. Now we wish to 
consider fate of a much smaller region within such a universe, a region which we shall 
call—for obvious reasons—the observable region,. What conclusions can one draw 
from the existence of a large thermodynamical disequilibrium in the observable 
region?  
 This issue has, historically, been the central part of Boltzmann's thinking about 
the nature of the second law of thermodynamics. Although he knew nothing about the 
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cosmic microwave background, he knew very well the Olbers' paradox and 
understood that the thermodynamical disequilibrium is a necessary (although 
presumably not sufficient) condition for creation of life and ultimately intelligence. 
Therefore, he suggested two possible recourses: one which postulated very special 
initial conditions (that is, a universe of finite age, and low initial entropy), and 
another, that what we see is a large enough fluctuation of entropy creating the local 
condition of thermodynamical disequilibrium, while all matter is approaching 
equilibrium reigning in the universe at large. Since any intelligent observers could 
exist in the disequilibrium condition, it is only reasonable that we perceive the 
universe as we do, far from equilibrium, and possessing a definite thermodynamical 
arrow of increasing entropy. In the words of Boltzmann (1895) himself:   
 
If we assume the universe great enough, we can make the probability of 
one relatively small part being in any given state (however far from the 
state of thermal equilibrium), as great as we please. We can also make the 
probability great that, though the whole universe is in thermal equilibrium, 
our world is in its present state. It may be said that the world is so far from 
thermal equilibrium that we cannot imagine the improbability of such a 
state. But can we imagine, on the other side, how small a part of the whole 
universe this world is? Assuming the universe great enough, the 
probability that such a small part of it as our world should be in its present 
state, is no longer small.  
 
However, this is not stated by Boltzmann as the primary option, and he even gave 
credit for this idea to his assistant, Dr. Schuetz. The other possibility—listed as the 
primary option—is the existence of special initial conditions of very low entropy, 
from which the universe evolves toward states of higher and higher disorder. Now, 
there exists a problem in an ever-existing universe that the initial conditions need to 
be formulated in asymptotic limit t → −∞, and these difficulties are circumvented 
only by additional postulates, like that of spacetime as an infinite reservoir of negative 
entropy (Davies 1974). In evolving universes of finite age, like the Friedmann models, 
this is seemingly alleviated by postulating a singular origin at t = 0, although another 
problem appears in place of the previous one: improbability of so low entropy Big 
Bang when compared to the generic case of global singularity (Penrose 1979). In spite 
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of these circumstances, as Barrow and Tipler point out in their (1986) monograph, 
invoking some kind of special initial conditions was in general much more popular 
among cosmologists, and for a good reason. Since Hubble's discovery of the 
expanding universe—and in particular since the victory of the standard Big Bang 
cosmology over its great steady state rival (Kragh 1996)—the special character of the 
initial conditions became a part of the core of the standard cosmological paradigm. 
However, from time to time, the second option has also been put forward, mainly by 
philosophers, and it is there that the main obstacle to its operationalization has been 
noted. The intrinsic difficulty in the entropy-fluctuation picture is connected with the 
very basis of statistical reasoning employed. In words of Price (1996): 
 
If we wish to accept that our own region is the product of “natural” 
evolution from a state of even lower entropy, therefore, we seem bound to 
accept that our region is far more improbable than it needs to be, given its 
present entropy... If the choice is between (1) fluctuations which create the 
very low-entropy conitions from which we take our world to have evolved, 
and (2) fluctuations which simply create it from scratch with its current 
macroscopic configuration, then choice (2) is overwhelmingly more pro-
bable. Why? Simply by definition, once entropy is defined in terms of 
probabilities of microstates for given macrostates. So the most plausible 
hypothesis—overwhelmingly so—is that the historical evidence we take to 
support the former view is simply misleading, having itself been produced 
by the random fluctuation which produced our world in something very 
close to its current condition.  
 
This is the crux of the problem: our observations in the entropy-fluctuation picture do 
not correspond to reality—and not for epistemological, but for physical reasons. The 
argument has been put forward for the first time by von Weizsäcker (1939). The entire 
evidence pertaining to what is conventionally called past is false or simulated; 
notably, this applies to cosmological knowledge on the physical state of the universe 
at previous epochs. Beyond certain region which surrounds our spatiotemporal 
location, the universe is in thermodynamical equilibrium, but we have no real 
information on matter in that external region. In the internal region, however, it is 
only natural to see things in such a way that states of smaller and smaller entropy are 
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envisaged as we look deeper and deeper into the (conventionally labelled) past. If one 
could apply Boltzmann-Schuetz model to the modern cosmology (which can be, in 
general, fairly well approximated by Newtonian models, except very close to the 
initial singularity), this “simulation” would include such paramount observations in 
modern cosmology, as is the existence and properties of cosmic microwave 
background radiation or young galaxies seen in modern deep-field images. 
 However, in order to see the main point of the present study, it is not necessary 
to track the details of possible application of this model to conventional cosmological 
wisdom. There is an entirely different aspect of the story, which is seen in Barrow and 
Tipler's dubbing the Boltzmann-Schuetz idea “anthropic fluctuation picture”, 
therefore implying its close connection with at least some of the various anthropic 
principles. The present author has argued elsewhere that at least some of the so-called 
anthropic principles are certainly not principles, but workable scientific hypotheses 
(Ćirković and Bostrom 2000). What exactly is “anthropic” in the Boltzmann-Schuetz 
entropy fluctuation model? 
The central idea is, of course, that we could not exist in the state of 
thermodynamical equilibrium, and that, therefore, some restrictions on possible 
worlds are imposed by our existence as intelligent observers in this specific case. Is 
that enough to constitute anthropic nature of an argument? This does not seem 
obvious at all. For instance, nobody has invoked anthropic reasoning when discussing 
incapability of other planets in the Solar system to support life and intelligence; 
underlying physical mechanisms in this case are (allegedly) sufficiently well 
understood (e.g. Dole 1964) that the teleological mode of explanation can be 
substituted by a more conventional one.1 Weak anthropic principle (henceforth 
WAP), the very foundation of entire anthropic reasoning, has been originally defined 
by the following locution (Carter 1974):  
 
…the effect that we must be prepared to take account of the fact that our 
location in the universe is necessarily privileged to the extent of being 
compatible with our existence as observers. (p. 127) 
 
Alternatively, one can use the definition of Barrow and Tipler (1986):  
                                                          
1 In this connection see the analysis of explanatory power of anthropic arguments by Balashov (1990); 
somewhat different opinions are expressed in Earman (1987) and Kragh (1997).  
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The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not 
equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that 
there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the 
requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so. 
(p. 16) 
 
Tha latter does explicitly deal with observations, and not “underlying reality” (or just 
“values of all… quantities”). However, as a statement on observations, it possesses no 
true epistemological value. The reason for this (seemingly too strong) thesis can be 
found in subsequent discourse of the same authors in discussion, for instance, of the 
dimensionality of space, one of the great questions of theoretical physics which is an 
obvious field for anthropic reasoning. The very title of the seminal Ehrenfest (1917) 
article on the topic (discussed at length in the Barrow and Tipler monograph, pp. 258-
276) speaks for itself: In what way does it become manifest in the fundamental laws of 
physics that space has three dimensions? The usage of “manifest” instead of, say, 
“apparent” or “perceived” indicates that the explanation is to be offered through 
anthropic reasoning for something taken at the phenomenal level. This should be 
compared with “simulations” of reality implicit in the Boltzmann-Schuetz picture; 
while those can be interpreted as “observed values” in Barrow and Tipler definition, 
there is contradiction with the Carter's requirement that our location (on which data 
are not simulated) imposes true restrictions on the state of the universe at large. This 
seems another instance in which Barrow-Tipler definition is inferior to Carter's, from 
a physical—one may even say practical—point of view (for more on the issue of 
definitional differences see Bostrom 2002).  
In the amount in which WAP is a cornerstone of the entire anthropic 
reasoning, Boltzmann-Schuetz idea is, therefore, antithetical to the substance of the 
latter. It implies not only a negation of the cognitive value of our observations, but 
also breaks the basic connection between the local and global processes. The point of 
the WAP constraints, as there were conceived by Dicke and explicated by Carter, has 
been exactly to deal with real properties of the universe, not how the universe could or 
should look like. It should not just look flat enough; it must really be flat in order for 
WAP to meaningfully work. Presumably, a thesis suggesting that WAP is dealing 
only with observations of ours with all their inherent limitations can be defended. 
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However, in the view we are defending here, it would present a betrayal of the spirit 
of the entire anthropic reasoning, and—what is much worse—would ultimately 
require a revision of most of our basic assumptions first of all in cosmology and 
particle physics, and contingently in other scientific disciplines as well. Obviously 
(from the context of their writings) that Dicke, Carter, Barrow and Tipler, and other 
authors, have not been considering the possibility that our empirical evidence is just a 
mirage. 
This is, of course, not to imply that the entropy-fluctuation picture is simply 
wrong, even in the framework of our classical, non-expanding universe. However, 
there is a host of epistemological problems with it which make it at least highly 
suspicious. Whether a theory implying simulated nature of most empirical evidence 
may be considered scientifical at all is not obvious. For instance, there seems to 
appear problems with falsifiability in the Popperian sense. As far as cosmology is 
concerned, in a founding paper of the historically crucial steady state theory, Bondi 
and Gold (1948) have emphasized the desirability of as uniform physical laws as 
possible. In addition, the conceptual ease of empirical refuting the steady state theory 
made it a paradigm of the Popperian notion of scientific theory, as later elaborated by 
Bondi (1967). Although the steady state theory is now universally considered defunct, 
its impact in the epistemology and philosophy of cosmology has been instrumental in 
the formation of modern cosmological thought. In the now accepted standard 
paradigm based on Friedmann models the uniformity of laws is preserved in entire 
spacetime except at initial (and possibly final) singularity. The Boltzmann-Schuetz 
picture is an extreme example of opposite attitude, in which the very concept of 
physical law becomes vacuous. Therefore, it is hardly a scientific theory in Popperian 
sense. Parenthetically, the entropy-fluctuation picture for the same reasons violates 
Reichenbach's principle of the common cause, which states that improbable 
coincidences are always associated with an earlier common cause. Therefore, it puts 
us in an uncomfortable position of having to consider only sufficiently isolated 
systems as causally ordered. This potentially undermines most of usual notions of 
description in physical sciences, since one can never be entirely certain that his 
system is isolated enough. A similar (but less disturbing) situation occurs in some 
other attempts to make local physics dependent on largely unknown and potentially 
unknowable cosmological processes or boundary conditions (for instance, in Hoyle 
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and Narlikar attempts at building an action-at-distance description of inertial 
properties of matter; e. g. Hoyle and Narlikar 1972; Hoyle 1975).  
One can reach the same conclusion from another point of view. The entropy 
fluctuation picture (correctly) and the anthropic principle itself (in our opinion 
incorrectly) have been criticized on the basis of what can be called “Adam’s 
dilemma” (from Milton's Paradise Lost); the most widely cited formulation of this 
criticism is due to Feynman (1965). The great physicist concluded that the entropy 
fluctuation picture is “ridiculous” since it requires much larger entropy fluctuation in 
both spatial and temporal sense than the one necessary for the actual emergence of 
intelligent observers; thus it is in conflict with Occam's razor. This criticism, while 
prima facie irreproachable, applies seriously only to the classical, Boltzmann 
discussion. As we have noted, Boltzmann and Schuetz have actually known next to 
nothing about what we perceive today as the state of the universe on cosmological 
scales, and could rely only on a very limited set of local (in spatiotemporal sense) 
observations. Moreover, even today it is not at all obvious how large entropy 
fluctuation is actually needed for the emergence of life and intelligence on Earth. As 
an antidote to Feynman's cognitive optimism, one may cite the classical study of 
Collins and Hawking (1973), where it was argued that properties of spacetime on the 
largest scales are necessary preconditions for our existence (the detailed discussion of 
this issue is to be found in Barrow and Tipler 1986). Boltzmann, however, was quite 
correct that any size of fluctuation can, ultimately, be achieved in his globally static 
world of classical physics; in this sense, Feynman may only criticize this picture on 
account of its improbability, i.e. sufficiently small measure on a subset of all 
conceivable observer-creating fluctuations. This measure is small indeed, at least in 
the spatial sense, since the observed universe is so much bigger than the terrestrial 
biosphere (as far as the temporal scale is concerned, the case is much more difficult to 
establish, since the timescales for evolution of intelligence are comparable to 
cosmological timescales in realistic Friedmann-Robertson-Walker  universes). 
However, this problem is entirely circumvented by recalling the overwhelming 
probability that our empirical knowledge is simulated in this picture. The fluctuation 
could indeed be much smaller, as Milton's Adam, Feynman and others supposed; 
however, we do not need to know about this. In fact, it is due only to the widespread 
confusion plaguing the field that Feynman has reportedly criticized anthropic 
 8 
principle, when discussing the entropy-fluctuation picture. His criticism is in place 
when applied to the conventional form of the latter, but the picture itself has nothing 
to do with the anthropic principle whatsoever. Interestingly enough, in the course of 
this criticism, Feynman has put forward a necessity for a time-asymmetric law of 
nature to explain the entropy gradient, a proposal which was later strongly publicized 
by Penrose (for instance see Penrose 1979).    
It has been established long ago, notably by great French physicist, 
mathematician and philosopher Henry Poincaré (1946)—and later elaborated by the 
founder of the modern computer science Wiener (1961)—that the sense of increasing 
entropy is essential for existence of intelligent observers. Without entering into 
discussion on whether other forms of complex organization of matter can exist in an  
entropy-decreasing universe, one notes that in the Boltzmann entropy fluctuation 
picture, there is necessarily a finite period of time in which the entropy did actually 
decrease. This period, therefore, necessarily preceeded the appearance of intelligent 
life on our planet. Together with our knowledge about the history of human intelligent 
observers, this gives us a lower limit to our local displacement relative to the 
minimum of the entropy curve. However, since one can envisage the time when exact 
mechanism of evolution and processes accompanying emergence of intelligence will 
become known facts, it seems a posteriori improbable that a smooth transition 
between “simulated” (cosmological) and “real” (anthropo-biological) evidence could 
be achieved. This may be regarded as a possible (still distant, of course) argument 
against the entropy fluctuation picture per se, although we can not devote more 
attention to this issue here.  
The present discourse applies to the classical universe, considered as a single 
topologically connected cosmological domain. In the recent literature in both 
cosmology and philosophy, there is a surge of interest in the concept of multiverse—
set of different cosmological domains, possibly causally and/or topologically 
disconnected from our “observable” domain—as the most comprehensive description 
of everything that exists. A variation on the Boltzmann-Schuetz theme can be played 
within the multiverse framework, in which our existence as observers selects a 
particular domain (“universe”), as a domain of exceptionally low entropy content. A 
detailed discussion of this idea is beyond the scope of the present work, but two points 
may be made immediately. Since the anthropic selection effect affects initial 
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conditions (“Big Bangs”) of multiple universes, such a proposal would arguably be 
closer to the Boltzmann’s primary option than to the entropy-fluctuation picture. On 
the other hand, such an approach would essentially vindicate our observational 
knowledge on the structure of our domain on the largest scales, thus leading to no 
epistemological quandary of the sort discussed in the present article.  
In conclusion, modern understanding of the entropy-fluctuation picture 
immediately implies the simulated nature of most of our cosmological evidence (as 
well as all other evidence pertaining to the perceived past). This does not correspond 
to the phenomena in common empirical sense of the word, and therefore immediately 
implies a massive violation of the WAP constraints. Thus, the attribute “anthropic”, 
arbitrarily associated with this picture, is largely shallow and superficial. By 
unravelling this semantical confusion, we immediately gain a proper account of the 
problem von Weizsäcker, Feynman and others have perceived, which can not truly 
jeopardize the epistemological and methodological status of WAP (and, contingently, 
other anthropic principles incorporating WAP as their core).  
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